Static Internal Representation Of Dynamic Situations Reveals Time
  Compaction In Human Cognition by Villacorta-Atienza, Jose Antonio et al.
*	Both	authors	contributed	equally	
STATIC	INTERNAL	REPRESENTATION	OF	DYNAMIC	SITUATIONS	REVEALS	TIME	COMPACTION	IN	
HUMAN	COGNITION	
José	Antonio	Villacorta-Atienza1,2,	Carlos	Calvo-Tapia2,*,	Sergio	Díez-Hermano1,*,	Abel	Sánchez-Jiménez1,2,	Sergey	Lobov3,	Nadia	Krilova3,	Antonio	Murciano1,	Gabriela	López-Tolsa4,	Ricardo	Pellón4,	Valeri	Makarov2,3		1.	Biomathematics	Unit	(BEE	Department),	Faculty	of	Biology,	Complutense	University	of	Madrid,	Spain.		2.	Institute	of	Interdisciplinary	Mathematics	(IMI),	Faculty	of	Mathematics,	Complutense	University	of	Madrid,	Spain.	3.	Lobachevsky	State	University	of	Nizhny	Novgorod,	Russia.	4.	Department	of	Basic	Psychology,	Universidad	de	Educación	a	Distancia	(UNED),	Spain	.	
The	 time-changing	 nature	 of	 our	 world	 demands	 processing	 of	
huge	amounts	of	information	in	fast	and	reliable	way	to	generate	
successful	 behaviors	 [Llinás	 2001].	 Therefore,	 significant	 brain	
resources	 are	 devoted	 to	 process	 spatiotemporal	 information	
[Rao	 2001,	 Livesey	 2007,	 Kraus	 2013].	 Neural	 basis	 of	 spatial	
processing	 and	 their	 cognitive	 correlates	 are	 well	 established	
mostly	for	static	environments	[O’Keefe	1976,	Fynn	2004,	Epstein	
2017].	Nonetheless,	in	time-changing	situations	the	brain	exploits	
specific	 processing	mechanisms	 for	 temporal	 information	 based	
on	prediction	and	anticipation	[Bubic	2010],	as	time	compression	
during	 visual	 perception	 [Ekman	 2017]	 and	 mental	 navigation	
[Arnold	 2016].	 Alternative	 hypothesis	 of	 time	 compaction	
integrates	 both	 views,	 postulating	 that	 dynamic	 situations	 are	
internally	 represented	 as	 static	 spatial	 maps	 where	 temporal	
information	 is	 extracted	 by	 predicting	 and	 structuring	 the	
relevant	 interactions	 [Villacorta-Atienza	 2010].	 Nevertheless,	
empirical	 approaches	 tackling	 the	 biological	 soundness	 of	 time	
compaction	are	still	lacking.	Here	we	show	that	performance	in	a	
discrimination	learning	task	involving	dynamic	situations	can	be	
either	favored	or	hampered	via	previous	exposition	to	interfering	
static	 scenes.	 In	 this	 sense,	men	were	 effectively	 conditioned	 in	
contrast	 to	 a	 control	 group,	 in	 coherence	 with	 the	 hypothesis.	
Meanwhile,	 women	 performed	 on	 par	 with	 control	 men,	
regardless	 of	 the	 previous	 conditioning.	 This	 suggests	 time	
compaction	 is	 a	 salient	 cognitive	 strategy	 in	 men	 when	 dealing	
with	dynamic	situations,	while	women	seem	to	rely	on	a	broader	
range	 of	 information	 processing	 strategies	 [Peña	 2008,	 Picucci	
2011].	 Finally,	 we	 further	 corroborated	 the	 time	 compaction	
mechanism	 involved	 in	 these	 experimental	 findings	 through	 a	
mathematical	 model	 of	 the	 experimental	 process.	 Our	 results	
point	to	some	form	of	static	internal	representation	mechanism	at	
cognitive	level	involved	in	decision-making	and	strategy	planning	
in	 dynamic	 situations.	 The	 existence	 of	 time	 compaction	 in	 the	
human	 brain	 could	 provide	 a	 functional	 framework	 unifying	
essential	 aspects	 of	 cognition	 demanded	 for	 active	 interaction	
with	 our	 world,	 introducing	 a	 new	 venue	 to	 embed	 human-like	
basic	cognition	in	robots	[Villacorta-Atienza	2013].	Temporal	and	spatial	dimensions	are	prominent	organizing	features	in	nature,	 so	 anticipation	 to	 complex	 dynamic	 hazards	 is	mandatory	 to	survive	[Maldonato	2012].	Thus,	prediction	has	been	proposed	as	the	ultimate	brain	function	[Llinás	2001].	Founded	on	this	capability,	time	compaction	provides	an	efficient	mechanism	to	structure	and	process	the	critical	information	contained	in	dynamic	environments.	According	to	 this	 theory,	 a	 dynamic	 situation	 is	 internally	 represented	 by	 the	predicted	 interactions	among	its	elements	(including,	 if	pertinent,	 the	subject	itself).	Such	interactions,	considered	as	the	relevant	events,	are	spatially	structured	in	a	static	map.	Therefore,	compacting	time	results	in	 a	 static	 spatial	 internal	 representation	 of	 the	 perceived	 time-changing	situation	[Villacorta-Atienza	2010].	As	time	is	no	present,	the	amount	of	information	the	brain	processes	is	drastically	reduced.	This	way,	the	presence	of	time	compaction	in	the	human	brain	suggests	that	the	cognitive	mechanisms	involved	in	both	time-changing	experiences	and	 static	 scenarios	 could	 be	 closely	 related,	 opening	 new	opportunities	 to	 the	 study	 of	 these	 cognitive	 phenomena	 [Villacorta-Atienza	2013].	
We	 assessed	 time	 compaction	 carrying	 out	 a	 decision-making	experiment,	 where	 human	 participants	 were	 prompted	 to	 classify	different	 situations	 displayed	 in	 a	 computer	 screen,	 according	 to	 an	underlying	rule.	In	order	to	introduce	the	experimental	procedure,	let	us	 consider:	 i)	 a	 simple	 dynamic	 situation	 where	 two	 circles	 are	moving	with	 collision	 trajectories,	 and	 ii)	 a	 static	 scene	with	 a	 single	immobile	 circle	 at	 the	 same	 location	 as	 the	 collision	 area	 in	 the	dynamic	situation.	According	to	the	hypothesis	of	time	compaction,	the	dynamic	 situation	 would	 be	 internally	 represented	 by	 the	 collision	area	 (relevant	 event).	 Thus,	 the	 static	 scene,	 denoted	 by	 SM	 (Static	Matching	scene),	and	the	dynamic	situation,	or	DM	(Dynamic	Matching	situation),	would	have	similar	static	internal	representations	(Fig.	1A).	During	 the	 experiment,	 properly	 classifying	 SM	 could	 either	 improve	or	worsen	later	classification	of	DM.	This	connection	was	exploited	to	unveil	 the	 presence	 of	 time	 compaction	 through	 a	 discrimination	learning	 task.	 Participants	 go	 through	 two	 sequential	 phases:	 a	conditioning	 training	 phase	 and	 a	 testing	 game.	 In	 the	 first	 phase	 a	succession	of	consecutive	static	scenes	is	displayed	on	the	screen.	Each	scene	 randomly	 shows	 one	 out	 of	 three	 different	 configurations:	 red	circle	 in	the	center	(SM)	or	on	the	left/right	(non-SM)	in	relation	to	a	reference	 green	 circle.	 The	 subject	 should	 press	 either	 up	 or	 down	arrow	 key	 on	 each	 presentation	 of	 a	 scene,	 and	 receives	 a	 feedback:	“success”	if	the	pressed	key	matches	a	pre-established	underlying	rule	(linking	scene	and	key)	or	“fail”	otherwise.	At	the	beginning	the	subject	does	not	know	the	correct	association	of	keys	and	situations.	Then,	by	trial-and-error	 he/she	 learns	 it	 and	 eventually	 begins	 responding	correctly.	Once	the	rule	has	been	learnt,	the	testing	game	starts.	During	the	game	 the	same	scheme	 is	 followed,	 in	 this	 case	showing	dynamic	situations.	 The	 subject	 should	 figure	 out	 the	 rule	 linking	 the	 up	 and	down	 keys	with	 six	 different	 dynamic	 situations,	 two	DMs	 (collision;	Fig	 1B,	 highlighted)	 and	 four	 non-DM	 (no	 collision;	 Fig	 1B,	 non-highlighted),	 displayed	 in	 random	 sequence.	 Note	 that	 the	 subject	watches	only	the	initial	part	of	a	situation,	i.e.,	collision	is	not	shown	on	the	screen.	Under	 the	 time	 compaction	 hypothesis,	 the	 previous	 learning	 of	 the	SM-key	 association	 during	 the	 training	 should	 interfere	 the	 rule	learning	 for	 DMs	 during	 the	 game.	 Through	 this	 relation	 we	established	 favorable	 or	 adverse	 conditionings	 in	 terms	 of	 time	compaction	 by	 adapting	 the	 underlying	 rule.	 We	 considered	 three	experimental	 groups:	 two	 including	 participants	 whose	 learning	performance	would	be	either	favored	or	hampered,	and	a	third	control	group	that	would	serve	as	a	baseline	of	non-influence	(Fig.	1C).	In	the	Favored	group,	the	sequence	comprised	one	SM	and	two	non-SMs.	The	SM	 arrow	 key	 coincides	 with	 the	 one	 associated	 to	 DM	 during	 the	game,	 while	 non-SM	 and	 non-DM	 were	 both	 linked	 to	 the	 opposite	arrow	key.	This	was	supposed	to	favor	learning	of	the	association	rule,	decreasing	the	number	of	trials	required	to	finish	the	game.	The	same	scheme	was	preserved	for	the	Control	group	but		SM	was	replaced	by	a	third	non-SM,	removing	the	postulated	effect	of	time	compaction.	This	way,	 conditioning	and	game	phases	were	 independent.	Finally,	 in	 the	Hampered	group	the	SM	arrow	key	was	opposite	to	the	one	associated	to	 DM,	 and	 non-SM	 keys	 were	 mismatched	 to	 avoid	 spurious	associations.	This	was	expected	 to	hamper	 the	 learning	of	 the	game’s	logic.	 It	 should	 be	 remarked	 that	 prior	 to	 the	 experiment,	 the	participants	were	not	aware	either	of	the	existence	of	collision-related	dynamic	situations	and	of	the	relationships	between	static	scenes	and	
dynamic	situations	displayed	 in	both	stages	 (see	Methods).	This	way,	the	 experiment	 was	 intended	 to	 uncover	 time	 compaction	 as	 an	unconscious	 mechanism	 to	 process	 dynamic	 situations,	 revealing	 1)	interactions	as	salient,	and	so	relevant,	events,	and	2)	that	such	events	are	represented	as	static	structures.		
	
Figure	1.	Experimental	approach	for	testing	time	compaction	hypothesis.	
A.	According	to	time	compaction,	static	matching	scene,	or	SM	(left	screen),	and	dynamic	 matching	 situation,	 or	 DM	 (right	 screen),	 have	 similar	 internal	representations	since	position	of	immobile	circle	in	SM	matches	with	location	of	expected	collision	in	DM.	B.	The	testing	game	consists	 in	figuring	out,	by	trial-and-error,	 the	 relationship	 between	 up-down	 arrow	 keys	 and	 six	 dynamic	situations:	 the	 DM,	 two	 non-DMs,	 and	 their	 symmetric	 counterparts.	 In	 DM	situations	(highlighted	in	purple	and	linked	to	the	down	arrow	key)	the	red	and	green	circles	move	 to	collide,	 though	collision	 is	not	shown	to	 the	participant.	Non-DM	situations	(linked	to	 the	up	arrow	key)	show	circles	whose	velocities	prevent	collision.	Green	circle’s	velocity	remains	constant	in	all	situations.	Faint	colors	 represent	 past	 frames	 in	 the	 movement	 of	 the	 circles.	 C.	 Different	relations	 established	 in	 the	 conditioning	 training	phase	between	 static	 scenes	and	up-down	arrow	keys	could	favor	or	hamper	the	testing	game	performance.	For	 Favored/Hampered	 groups	 the	 SM	 scene	 (highlighted	 in	 purple)	 is	associated	 to	 the	 same/different	key	 than	 in	DM.	For	Control	 group,	no	SM	 is	displayed,	 so	 the	 rule	 is	 not	 connected	 to	 DM	 according	 to	 time	 compaction	hypothesis.	Assuming	Control	group	is	not	conditioned,	the	Favored/Hampered	groups	 should	 need	 less/more	 trials	 to	 learn	 the	 game	 rule.	 Note	 that	 the	relationship	 between	 arrow	 keys	 and	 displayed	 scenes	 and	 situations	 is	randomly	counterbalanced	for	each	participant.	Considering	the	set	of	answers	from	all	participants	(126	men	and	135	women)	we	characterized	the	population	learning	process	by	defining	the	 success	 rate	 per	 trial	 (Fig.	 2A).	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 population	learning	process	was	performed	by	modeling	the	success	rate	through	general	 estimating	 equations	 (GEE)	 and	 logistic	 regression	 analysis.	The	 independent	variables	 involved,	 apart	 from	 trial	 (inherent	 to	 the	learning),	 were	 gender,	 group	 and	 researcher	 (the	 person	 who	conducted	 the	 experiment).	 Only	 gender	 and	 group	 were	 found	significant.	Population	learning	in	men	was	significantly	faster/slower	for	 Favored/Hampered	 groups	 compared	 with	 Control.	 Nonetheless	women	 showed	 no	 significant	 differences	 either	 among	 Favored,	Hampered	and	Control	groups	or	against	men	in	Control	group.		To	 characterize	 the	 individual	 learning	 performance,	 we	 introduced	the	learning	length	of	each	participant	as	the	number	of	trials	required	to	 figure	 out	 the	 rule	 (Fig	 2B).	Men	 from	Favored/Hampered	 groups	had	 significantly	 higher/lower	 probability	 of	 learning	 at	 early	 trials	
than	men	in	Control	group.	On	the	contrary,	conditioning	phase	did	not	affect	 the	 individual	 learning	 of	 women,	 showing	 no	 significant	differences	 against	 men	 in	 Control.	 These	 differences	 in	 individual	learning	performance	are	evidenced	through	Kaplan-Meier	curves	and	survival	 analysis	 (Fig	 2B,	 inset	 panels).	 These	 findings	 reveal	 an	intrinsic	 relationship	 between	 SM	 scenes	 and	 DM	 situations.	 That	suggests	 men	 primarily	 represent	 dynamic	 situations	 by	 the	 static	representation	 of	 relevant	 interactions	 (DMs	 and	 its	 SM	 correlate,	which	contains	the	location	of	the	expected	collision),	thus	significantly	reducing	the	information	complexity.	Furthermore,	our	results	support	women	seemingly	rely	on	a	broader	range	of	cognitive	strategies	[REF	Peña	 2008,	 Picucci	 2011]	 in	 conjunction	 with	 time	 compaction,	 as	revealed	by	non	differences	with	Control	men.	In	order	to	go	deeper	into	participants’	decision	making,	we	aimed	to	analyze	 potential	 relationships	 between	 verbalization	 of	 the	 game	association	 rule	 and	 the	 individual	 learning	 performance.	 For	 this	purpose,	 after	 they	 finished	 the	 game,	 participants	 were	 asked	 for	writing	the	rule	they	figured	out.	Generalized	linear	model	(GLM)	and	logistic	regression	revealed	that	fast-learning	men	showed	a	significant	tendency	to	answer	in	terms	of	‘collision’,	regardless	the	experimental	group;	otherwise,	the	more	learning	time	they	required,	the	more	they	seemed	to	resort	to	an	alternative	strategy	based	on	other	criteria.	On	the	 contrary,	 for	women	 such	 a	 tendency	was	 not	 observed	 (Fig.	 2C,	men	and	women	upper	panels).	This	is	coherent	with	previous	results,	pointing	to	gender	differences	 in	the	preference	for	time	compaction-based	strategy	for	learning	the	game	rule.		Additionally,	we	 studied	 other	 factors	 that	might	 influence	 the	 game	performance.	 To	 this	 extent,	we	 analyzed	 the	 answer	 latency,	 i.e.	 the	time	 elapsed	 since	 the	 displayed	 situation	 disappeared	 until	 the	participant	pressed	the	key.	GEE	analysis	revealed	that	answer	latency	did	not	significantly	differ	either	between	men	and	women	or	among	experimental	 groups	 (Fig.	 2C,	 men	 and	women	 bottom	 panels).	 This	indicates	 all	 participants	 take	 comparable	 times	 to	 resolve	 individual	trials,	 which	 suggests	 similar	 difficulty	 for	 figuring	 out	 the	 rule	regardless	 previous	 conditioning.	 Thus,	 as	 postulated	 by	 time	compaction,	 differences	 in	 game	 performance	 could	 be	 attributed	 to	the	effect	of	the	conditioning	on	the	information	features	used	to	solve	the	game.	The	 experimental	 results	 here	 reported	 suggest	 a	 time	 compaction-based	 mechanism	 involved	 in	 human	 decision-making	 when	 dealing	with	 dynamic	 situations.	 To	 corroborate	 such	 a	 mechanism	 from	 a	complementary	perspective,	we	mathematically	modeled	the	 learning	during	 the	 game	 under	 conditioning	 and	 control	 conditions,	 and	compared	 the	 theoretical	 and	 experimental	 results.	 The	 model	assumes	 a	 successful	 answer	 probability	 with	 recalling	 exponential	decay	 [Nembhard	 2001,	 Averell	 2011],	 biased	 according	 to	 time	compaction	 premises:	 due	 to	 the	 assumed	 similar	 internal	representation	 of	 SM	 and	 DMs,	 favorably	 conditioned	 participants	started	 the	 game	with	 a	 set	 of	 associations	 already	 learned,	whereas	hampered	 participants	 needed	 to	 re-elaborate	 the	 game’s	 rule	(Supplementary	Material).		The	 modeling	 of	 the	 learning	 process	 during	 the	 game	 involved	 the	population	learning	process,	described	by	analytical	equations,	and	the	individual	 learning	 performance,	 via	 computational	 simulation,	engaged	 in	 a	 recursive	 process.	 The	 analytical	 model	 describes	 the	probability	 of	 successful	 answer	 at	 each	 trial	 T,	 which	 is	 given	 for	Favored,	Control	and	Hampered	groups	respectively,	by:	!! = 1 − !! !! !!! 1 + ! !,! + ! !,! ,	!! = 1 − !! !! !!! 1 + ! !,! + ! !,! ,	!! = 1 − !! !! !!! !! + ! !,! + ! !,! ,	where	⍺	and	β	stands	for	the	recalling	terms	for	the	second	and	third	appearance	 of	 a	 stimulus,	 and	 a	 and	 b	 denote	 the	 corresponding	recalling	constants	(see	Supplementary).			
Figure	 2.	 Population	 learning	 process	 and	 individual	 learning	
performance.	 Top	 and	 bottom	 rows	 correspond	 to	 men	 and	 women,	respectively;	blue,	black,	and	red	colors	stand	for	Favored	(F),	Control	(C),	and	Hampered	 (H)	 groups	 respectively	 (F:	 48	 men,	 52	 women;	 C:	 40	 men,	 35	women;	H:	38	men,	48	women).	A.	Population	learning	process	as	success	rate	per	 trial	 (sample	 average	 of	 correct	 answers)	 was	 considered	 up	 to	 0.99	(dashed	lines).	Men	in	Favored/Hampered	groups	learned	the	game	association	rule	 faster/slower	 than	men	 in	Control	 group	 (F	vs.	C:	p	 =	3e-04;	F	vs.	H:	p	 =	9.8e-13;	C	vs.	H:	p	=	2.5e-04).	Population	learning	process	in	women	showed	no	dependence	on	the	direction	of	conditioning	(F	vs.	C:	p	=	0.43;	F	vs.	H:	p	=	0.28;	C	vs.	H:	p	=	0.93).	Men	from	Control	group	and	women	from	all	groups	did	not	show	 significant	 differences	 (p	 =	 0.23,	 n	 =	 40	 vs.	 135).	 Curves	 describe	 the	logistic	 regression	 of	 the	 corresponding	 population	 learning.	 B.	 Individual	learning	performance.	The	learning	length	distribution	shows	it	is	significantly	more/less	likely	for	men	in	Favored/Hampered	groups	to	learn	the	association	rule	at	early	 trials	 than	 in	Control	 condition	 (F	vs.	C:	p	=	7.2e-04;	F	vs.	H:	p	=	3.5e-8;	C	vs.	H:	p	=	5.8e-03).	This	effect	was	not	observed	in	women	(F	vs.	C:	p	=	
0.98;	F	vs.	H:	p	=	0.67;	C	vs.	H:	p	=	0.76).	Men	from	Control	group	and	women	from	all	groups	did	not	show	significant	differences	(p	=	0.95,	n	=	40	vs.	135).	Insets	show	the	Kaplan-Meier	curves	used	to	quantify	differences	in	individual	learning	performance	[Smith	2011].	 	Dotted	curves	denote	the	 learning	 length	where	learning	probability	is	0.5.	C.	Rule	verbalization	and	answer	latency.	Men	and	 women	 top	 panels:	 rule	 verbalization	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘collision’	 had	 a	probability	above	0.7	for	those	men	who	quickly	learned	the	rule,	regardless	the	direction	 of	 the	 conditioning,	 and	 decreases	 with	 the	 learning	 length.	 No	dependency	 was	 observed	 in	 women.	 Curves	 and	 grey	 areas	 denote	 logistic	regression	and	mean	confidence	intervals	at	95%	respectively	(men:	p	=	1.2e-4,	
n	 =	 126;	 women:	 p	 =	 0.67,	 n	 =	 135).	 Learning	 lengths	 were	 grouped	 in	 four	groups:	 those	with	 learning	 lengths	 lower	 than	or	equal	 to	20	and	 those	with	learning	 lengths	 in	 [21,30],	 [31,	 40],	 and	 [40,	 46].	 Men	 and	 women	 bottom	panels:	 the	 answer	 latency	 showed	 no	 differences	 among	 groups	 (GEE	regression,	F	vs.	C:	p	=	0.13,	n	=	100	vs.	75;	F	vs.	H:	p	=	0.45,	n	=	100	vs.	86;	C	vs.	H:	p	=	0.42,	n	=	86	vs.	75)	and	for	gender	(p	=	0.4,	n	=	126	men	vs.	135	women).	***:	<	0.001;	**:	<	0.01;	*:	<	0.05;	NS:	No	Significant	difference.	
The	recursive	process	to	simulate	the	learning	during	the	game	phase	is	 as	 follows.	 First,	 the	 analytical	 model	 of	 the	 population	 learning	process	 for	 Favored,	 Control	 and	Hampered	 groups	was	 fitted	 to	 the	corresponding	experimental	data.	The	 two	parameters	obtained	 from	the	fitting	were	then	incorporated	into	the	computer	simulation	to	get	those	 participants	 who	 could	 not	 follow	 the	 model,	 which	 were	extracted	 from	 the	 sample	 (though	 they	may	 eventually	 be	 included	again	 in	 subsequent	 iterations).	 The	 model	 is	 then	 fitted	 to	 the	population	learning	data	from	the	updated	sample	and	the	cycle	begins	again.	 This	 recursive	 process	 continues	 until	 the	 sequence	 of	parameter	 values	 converges.	 The	 final	 parameter	 values	 were	introduced	 into	 the	 computer	 simulation	 to	 create	 a	 set	 of	 virtual	participants	solving	the	game.	The	 learning	 length	distribution	of	 this	virtual	 sample	 is	 compared	 with	 the	 experimental	 one	 for	 the	 final	updated	sample	in	Fig.	3.	The	agreement	of	the	experimental	data	with	the	 model	 provides	 additional	 support	 to	 the	 proposed	 mechanism	based	 on	 time	 compaction,	 particularly	 considering	 that	 for	 Favored	and	Control	groups	only	4%	and	5%	of	 the	sample	respectively	were	unfit	to	follow	the	model.	Modeling	of	Hampered	group	showed	a	24%	of	 subjects	 who	 did	 not	 behave	 according	 the	 model.	 This	subpopulation	 corresponded	 to	 participants	 with	 high	 learning	lengths,	 indicating	 that	 the	model	 does	 not	 capture	 properly	 specific	behaviors	of	 those	subjects,	possibly	related	with	model	assumptions	(e.g.	 hampered	 participants	 could	 require	 more	 than	 three	 stimulus	appearances	to	 learn,	 i.e.	more	than	two	parameters	 in	 the	model)	or	exogenous	 factors	 (motivation,	 frustration,	 etc.	 not	 included	 in	 the	model;	see	Supplementary).	
	
	
Figure	3.	Mathematical	model	of	game	process	based	on	time	compaction.	
A.	 Individual	 learning	 performance	 was	 computationally	 modeled	 with	 the	parameters	 obtained	 after	 convergence	 of	 the	 recursive	 process	 for	modeling	the	learning	during	the	game	(see	main	text).	Main	panels:	histogram	and	stair-like	curve	illustrate	experimental	and	modeled	individual	learning	performance	respectively	 (Favored	 in	blue,	 Control	 in	black,	 and	Hampered	 in	 red).	 Insets:	corresponding	 theoretical	 population	 learning	 process	 (curves)	 fitted	 to	 the	experimental	data	of	the	updated	sample	after	convergence	(dots).		The	 presence	 of	 time	 compaction	 revealed	 by	 the	 proposed	discrimination	 learning	 game	 has	 uncovered	 a	 clear	 gender	 biasing.	Though	 time	 compaction	 is	 hypothesized	 as	 a	 sex	 independent	cognitive	 mechanism,	 gender	 differences	 here	 reported	 are	 in	 full	agreement	 with	 the	 potential	 role	 of	 time	 compaction	 as	 cognitive	strategy.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 men	 frequently	 use	 holistic	 strategies,	gathering	information	about	spatial	relations	among	stimuli	to	plan	in	advance.	 In	 contrast,	 women	 more	 often	 use	 segmentary	 strategies,	
concentrating	 on	 particular	 aspects	 of	 relevant	 elements	 and	 less	focused	 on	 their	 relationships	 [Peña	2008].	 This	 supports	men	 could	exploit	 time	 compaction	 as	 a	 prominent	 strategy	 for	 dealing	 with	dynamic	 scenarios	 in	 a	 fast	 and	 reliable	 way,	 a	 critical	 feature	theoretically	postulated	for	this	mechanism	[Villacorta-Atienza	2010].	These	gender	differences	match	with	gender-linked	pressure	for	traits	as	foraging	division	(hunting	versus	gathering)	or	agonistic	behaviors	(projectile	 throwing	 and	 intercepting)	 [Eals	 1994,	 Jones	 2003].	 This	selection	 process	 [Ecuyer-Dab	 2004]	 suggests	 a	 sex-related	enhancement	 of	 specific	 biological	 mechanisms	 involved	 in	 complex	dynamic	 interactions,	 like	 hunting	 or	 fighting,	 consistent	 with	 the	nature	of	time	compaction	and	its	potential	impact	over	the	processing	of	 time-changing	 experiences	 in	 the	 human	 brain.	 Actually,	 gender	differences	described	here,	together	with	the	associative	nature	of	the	experiment	 conducted,	point	 time-compacted	 static	 representation	of	dynamic	 situations	 relays	 at	 cognitive	 level,	 beyond	 visual	 substrate	[Schutz	 2007,	 Kerzel	 2003],	where	mechanisms	 as	 time	 compression	[Ekman	 2017]	 and	 visual	 extrapolation	 [Delle	 Monache	 2017,	 Russo	2017]	 are	 located.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 notion	 of	 time	 compaction	resonates	with	the	concept	of	cognitive	map	[Epstein	2017].	Cognitive	map	 theory	 predicts	 hippocampus	 is	 involved	 into	 navigation	 to	unmarked	 locations,	 defined	 by	 their	 relationships	 with	 the	environment,	 but	 not	 into	 navigation	 to	 visible	 static	 goals	 [Morris	1982].	Nevertheless	avoidance	of	visible	dynamic	objects	depends	on	the	 hippocampus	 [Telensky	 2011].	 This	 apparent	 contradiction	suggests	 dynamic	 situations	 are	 internally	 represented	 from	 the	relationships	 among	 perceived	 elements.	 This	 is	 coherent	 with	 time	compaction,	 where	 the	 static	 representation	 is	 generated	 from	 the	expected	 interactions	 among	 elements	 in	 the	 time-changing	environment,	 including,	 if	 relevant,	 the	 subject	 itself.	 Moreover,	 it	raises	 the	 possibility	 that	 cognitive	 maps	 and	 time-compacted	 static	representations	 share	 neurobiological	 mechanisms.	 This	 could	 open	new	 perspectives	 for	 understanding	 the	 neural	 substrate	 enabling	cognitive	 interaction	 with	 our	 dynamic	 world,	 and	 introduce	 new	venues	 to	 embed	 human-like	 basic	 cognition	 in	 robots	 [Villacorta-Atienza	2013].	
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Methods	
Experimental	procedure	Participants	were	 subjected	 to	 a	 computer-based	 trial	 and	 error	 training	consisting	of	two	phases,	one	static	conditioning	followed	by	one	dynamic	game	 (see	 Fig.	 1).	 They	 completed	 the	 procedure	 individually,	 as	 no	interaction	between	them	was	allowed.	Before	the	session	the	researchers	read	aloud	 the	 instructions	 to	be	 followed,	which	were	also	shown	 in	 the	screen.	Any	doubt	asked	by	the	participants	was	answered	citing	again	the	instructions	 in	 the	monitor.	The	 instructions	referred	to	conditioning	and	game	 phases	 as	 static	 and	 dynamic	 stages,	 so	 no	 mention	 to	 the	relationship	 between	 both	 phases	 was	 done	 to	 the	 participants.	 The	structure	of	 the	 instructions	was	as	 follows.	First,	 it	was	detailed	that	 the	task	was	an	associative	experiment	consisting	on	a	static	phase	and	a	latter	dynamic	phase,	whose	objective	was	to	 find	out	 the	relationship	between	the	displayed	images	and	the	up-down	arrow	keys;	displayed	images	were	shown	 for	 1.5	 s	 and	were	 two	 static	 or	 dynamic	 circles	 (diameter	1	 cm),	colored	 in	 red	 and	 green,	 and	 presented	 on	 a	 white	 background.	 Simple	circles	 were	 chosen	 to	 avoid	 prior	 cognitive	 bias	 [Reed	 1996].	 The	instructions	relating	to	the	static	phase	(conditioning)	specified	the	green	circle	was	located	at	the	bottom	center	of	the	image	whereas	the	red	circle	appeared	randomly,	 from	trial	 to	trial,	at	 the	upper	 left,	center	or	right	of	the	 screen.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 instructions	 concerning	 the	 dynamic	stage	 explained	 that	 both	 green	 and	 red	 circles	 followed	 straight	 lines	 at	constant	 velocity;	while	 the	 green	 circle	 always	 started	 from	 the	 bottom	center	and	moved	upwards	vertically,	the	red	circle	changed	its	movement	randomly	 from	 trial	 to	 trial,	 and	 could	 appear	 at	 the	 bottom	 left	 or	 the	bottom	 right	 of	 the	 screen.	 Therefore,	 during	 instructions	 reading	 the	participants	were	not	aware	about	possible	collisions	between	the	moving	circles.	During	the	game	the	red	circle	moved	diagonally	alternating	between	three	different	 velocities;	 green	 circle’s	 velocity:	 4.5	 cm/s,	 red	 circle’s	 velocity:	1/3,	 2/3,	 and	 4/3	 relative	 to	 green	 circle’s	 speed.	 Dynamic	 situations	where	velocity	ratio	was	equal	to	2/3	correspond	to	circle	collision,	i.e.	to	the	 DMs.	 In	 DMs,	 collision	 would	 take	 place	 1	 second	 after	 circles	disappeared	(the	image	was	displayed	during	1.5	seconds).	There	was	no	 time	 limit	 to	complete	 the	stages,	even	 though	 there	was	a	maximum	number	of	80	possible	trials	per	phase	(conditioning	and	game).	The	 learning	 criterion	 was	 18	 correct	 responses	 in	 the	 last	 20	 trials	 for	each	participant.	The	trial	in	which	participants	reached	the	criterion	was	considered	 the	 learning	 length.	 Note	 that	 20	 trials	 is	 the	 most	 frequent	number	of	 trials	needed	for	every	scene	to	appear	at	 least	 twice	(Fig.	S1;	see	 Supplementary	 Material	 for	 further	 insight	 into	 task	 complexity	 and	stimulus	difficulty).	After	both	 conditioning	and	game	phases,	 participants	were	prompted	 to	write	down	the	underlying	association	rule	they	thought	best	explained	the	link	 between	 the	 displayed	 situations	 and	 the	 arrow	 keys.	 At	 the	 end	 of	game	phase	 they	were	asked	 to	 fill	a	 form	 in	order	 to	gather	 information	about	their	age	and	gender.	The	task	was	programmed	in	MATLAB	(MathWorks)	v17.	
Sample	description	Experiments	were	conducted	over	randomly	composed	groups	of	men	and	women.	 The	 final	 sample	 comprised	 those	 participants	 who	 fulfilled	 the	task	 in	 both	 phases	 showing	 a	 stable	 performance	 (see	 Supplementary	Material	 and	 Extended	 Data),	 which	 included	 those	 participants	 with	learning	lengths	smaller	or	equal	to	46	(n=261,	82%	of	the	total	sample;	w:	135,	m:	126).	Mean	 age	 of	 volunteers	was	 21.63	 (SD:	 7.23)	 for	women	 and	 23.08	 (SD:	8.86)	 for	men	 (no	 difference,	Welch	 test	 p-value	 =	 0.11).	 None	 reported	prior	attentional	problems.	All	had	normal	or	 corrected-to-normal	vision.	All	were	naïve	to	the	study’s	purpose	and	had	no	experience	with	the	tasks	and	 stimuli	 used	 here.	 Most	 subjects	 finished	 the	 experiment	 within	 10	minutes.	
Statistical	analysis	Analysis	of	experimental	results	focused	on	the	dynamic	phase.	
Time-to-event	curves	estimation	A	 time-to-event	 function	 representing	 the	 probability	 that	 a	 certain	proportion	of	individuals	had	learned	at	a	given	trial	was	obtained	through	the	Kaplan-Meier	non-parametric	estimator.	To	assess	whether	gender	and	
experiment	 might	 be	 simultaneously	 affecting	 the	 time-to-event	 curves	estimation	 a	multivariate	 Cox	 proportional	 hazard	 regression	model	was	fitted	(Jan-Eimermacher	2011,	Smith	2011).	The	model	assumptions	were	checked	via	 the	Schoenfeld	 test	 (Schoenfeld	1983,	Abeysekera	2009)	and	residuals	plots	against	time	for	each	covariate	(Fig.	S2A-B).		This	helped	to	identify	 two	potential	cutoffs	at	 learning	 lengths	20	and	46	 that	might	be	hampering	 the	 proportional	 hazards	 assumption.	 We	 extended	 the	 Cox	model	to	allow	for	time-dependent	coefficients	(Saegusa	2014)	using	a	step	function,	 dividing	 the	 sample	 in	 three	 learning	 length	 intervals:	 less	 than	20,	20-46,	and	greater	 than	46	(Fig.	S2C-D).	The	revised	 fit	 revealed	 that	the	 effect	 of	 the	 experiment	 was	 essentially	 limited	 to	 the	 first	 two	intervals.	
Learning	curves	estimation	General	estimating	equations	(GEE)	were	used	to	model	the	probability	of	success	 at	 a	 given	 trial,	 as	 it	 is	 risky	 to	 consider	 trials	 independent	 from	each	 other	 and	 GEEs	 allow	 for	 different	 correlation	 structures	 (Hanley	2002,	 Hardin	 2005,	 Hin	 LY	 2009).	 Binomial	 “logit”	 was	 used	 as	 link	function	given	the	dichotomous	nature	of	the	response	variable	(either	fail	a	trial	or	not).	A	backwards	stepwise	elimination	procedure	was	followed	to	 select	 the	minimal	 set	 of	 variables	with	 significant	 explanatory	power.	Variables	 taken	 into	 account	 were	 gender,	 group	 and	 trial	 number.	Successive	 nested	 models	 were	 compared	 using	 the	 F-test	 and	 the	Quasilikelihood	 Information	 Criterion	 (QIC)	 (Table	 S1)	 (Pan	 2001).	Interaction	terms	were	 interpreted	separately	 for	gender	and	experiment	(Table	 S2).	 To	 ensure	 the	model	 was	 characterizing	 the	 learning	 phase,	such	 a	 stage	 was	 considered	 as	 the	 set	 of	 trials	 with	 mean	 success	 rate	lower	 or	 equal	 to	 0.99.	 A	 factor	 indicating	 the	 different	 researchers	 that	conducted	the	experiment	was	introduced	in	the	model	and	no	significant	effect	was	found	(F-test	p-value	=	0.21).	This	is	indicative	that	there	was	no	detectable	 bias	 introduced	 in	 the	 results	 by	 the	 researcher	 and	 confirms	the	replicability	of	our	experimental	approach.	
Association	rule	verbalization	and	latency	times		Potential	 relationships	 between	 the	 verbalization	 of	 the	 association	 rule	found	by	the	participants	and	the	learning	length	were	explored	by	using	a	Generalized	 Linear	 Model	 (GLM)	 with	 binomial	 “logit”	 link	 function.	Regarding	verbalization,	96.2%	of	participants	 (251	 from	261)	expressed	the	dynamic	 rules	 in	 two	main	 categories:	 in	 ‘collision’	 terms	 (containing	words	as	collision,	crash,	finding,	etc.)	or	in	‘velocity’	terms	(with	words	as	velocity,	speed,	etc.).	The	rest	of	participants	(3.8%	–	10	from	261)	wrote	the	 dynamic	 rule	 by	 simultaneously	 including	 ‘collision’	 and	 ‘velocity’	terms	 or	 by	 means	 of	 spatially	 related	 descriptions	 based	 on	 directions,	positions,	etc.	On	the	other	hand,	the	learning	lengths	were	discretized	into	four	groups:	those	participants	who	learnt	before	or	at	trial	20,	and	those	with	 learning	 lengths	 in	 [21,30],	 [31,	 40],	 and	 [40,	 46];	 this	 sample	distribution	 allows	 the	 proper	 conditions	 for	 the	 statistical	 analysis.	Latency	time	differences	through	trials	due	to	experiment	or	gender	were	checked	by	fitting	a	GEE	with	gaussian	“identity”	link	function,	with	latency	as	a	continuous	response	variable.	All	 statistical	 analyses	 were	 performed	 in	 R	 v3.3.1,	 using	 the	 packages	survival	 (Therneau	 2015),	 survminer	 (Kassambara	 2017),	 geepack	(HÃ¸jsgaard	2006),	 stats,	 base	 (R	Core	Team	2016),	 and	dplyr	 (Wickham	2017).		
Mathematical	model	The	 mathematical	 model	 describes	 the	 experimental	 process	 of	 figuring	out	 the	 underlying	 association	 rule	 during	 the	 testing	 game.	 The	 model	quantifies	the	probability	of	successful	answer	at	each	trial,	based	on	four	assumptions:	1)	the	first	time	a	stimulus	appears	its	association	key	will	be	learnt	(if	the	pressed	key	was	not	correct	the	opposite	one	will	be	the	right	association	 key);	 thus	 wrong	 answers	 when	 the	 same	 stimulus	 appears	again	will	be	due	 to	defective	 recalling,	2)	 the	probability	of	 recalling	 the	key	associated	to	a	specific	stimulus	decays	exponentially	with	time,	3)	the	recalling	decay	rate	will	depend	on	the	number	of	times	the	same	stimulus	has	 appeared	 and	 will	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 specific	 stimulus,	 and	 4)	 we	assumed	that	after	the	same	stimulus	has	appeared	four	or	more	times	the	association	 key	 recall	 probability	 will	 be	 1	 and	 the	 selected	 key	 will	 be	always	 correct.	 This	 is	 a	 reasonable	 assumption	 since	 the	 successful	answer	 probability	 once	 the	 same	 stimulus	 has	 appeared	 four	 or	 more	times	 is	 0.97	 and	 0.88	 for	 men	 in	 Favored	 and	 Hampered	 groups	respectively,	and	0.91	considering	together	women	and	Control	men.	Time	 compaction	 was	 introduced	 into	 the	 model	 in	 terms	 of	 the	associations	(between	displayed	situations	and	keys)	to	be	learned	during	
the	 game	 after	 the	 previous	 conditioning	 training.	 For	 modeling	 the	performance	 of	 the	 Favored	 group	 during	 the	 game,	 only	 the	 four	associations	 for	 non	 DMs	 had	 to	 be	 learned,	 since	 it	 is	 assumed	 the	remaining	 two	 associations,	 for	 DMs,	 were	 previously	 learned	 in	 the	conditioning	 training	 phase.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 modeling	 the	 Hampered	group	 performance	 assumes	 the	 two	 associations	 for	 DMs	 must	 be	 re-elaborated	during	 the	 game,	 since	 they	were	wrongly	 learned	during	 the	conditioning	training	phase.	The	model	comprises	the	analytical	description	of	the	population	learning	process	 and	 the	 computational	 simulation	 of	 the	 individual	 learning	performance,	 and	 depends	 on	 two	 parameters,	 the	 recalling	 decay	 rates,		(see	Supplementary).	The	learning	of	the	associative	rule	during	the	game	was	 modeled	 by	 a	 recursive	 process	 where,	 in	 each	 iteration,	 the	experimental	 sample	 is	 updated	 to	 reject	 those	 participants	 (from	 each	group)	 that	 could	 not	 follow	 the	 model.	 First,	 the	 model	 parameters	 for	each	experimental	group	were	obtained	by	 fitting	 the	model	equations	 to	the	 experimental	 population	 learning	 data	 for	 the	 group	 sample.	 With	these	parameter	values,	it	was	checked	which	subjects	could	not	follow	the	mathematical	 model.	 These	 participants	 were	 then	 extracted	 from	 the	whole	 sample	 and	 the	 model	 was	 fitted	 again	 to	 the	 updated	 sample	 to	obtain	new	parameter	values.	This	way,	the	cycle	was	repeated	recursively	until	 the	 sequence	 of	 parameter	 values	 converged.	 Note	 that,	 in	 every	recursive	 step,	 the	 removal	 of	 those	 subjects	 that	 could	 not	 follow	 the	model,	was	done	over	 the	 initial	–whole-	sample,	 so	 the	same	participant	could	be	eventually	eliminated	from	the	sample	in	an	specific	iteration	and	included	 again	 in	 next	 iterations.	 After	 convergence,	 the	 final	 parameter	values	were	introduced	into	the	computational	model	to	generate	a	set	of	105	 virtual	 participants,	 simulating	 the	 game	 process,	 and	 obtaining	 the	theoretical	individual	learning	performance	(stair-like	curves	in	Fig.	3).		Probabilistic	model	parameters	were	estimated	 from	the	sample	 learning	rates	 by	 trust-region-reflective	 least	 squares	 fitting.	 Previously	 each	participant’s	answer	vector	was	filled	with	ones	(success)	from	its	learning	length	trial	to	the	maximum	learning	length	(46	trials).		Initially	the	model	was	 fitted	 only	 to	 women	 and	 control	 men	 together.	 Bootstrapped	confidence	 intervals	 were	 obtained	 for	 the	 two	 parameters.	 Then,	 the	model	was	fitted	to	men	in	Favored	and	Hampered	groups	constraining	the	first	 recalling	 rate	 values	 to	 the	 interval	 range	 found	 in	 Control,	 as	 we	expect	 that	 first	 repetition	 of	 any	 stimulus	 contain	 similar	 information	among	 conditionings.	 Final	 values	 of	 the	 pair	 of	 recalling	 decay	 rates	 for	Favored,	Control,	and	Hampered	groups	were:	[a,	b]		=	[0.2245,	0],	[0.2244,	0.0251],	and	[0.2244,	0.1034]	respectively.	The	 process	 to	 determine	 the	 subjects	 who	 did	 not	 follow	 the	 model	consist	of	several	steps.	1)	For	each	subject	we	considered	its	sequence	of	stimulus,	 i.e.	 the	 sequence	 of	 dynamic	 situations	 displayed	 during	 its	participation.	 2)	 Since	 the	 length	 of	 this	 sequence	 was	 equal	 to	 the	participant’s	 learning	 length,	 to	 introduce	 these	 stimuli	 into	 the	computational	 simulation	 of	 the	 game	 we	 completed	 the	 sequence,	randomly	adding	stimuli	until	 the	maximum	learning	 length	was	reached.	This	 step	was	 repeated	 103	 times	with	 each	 single	 stimulus	 sequence.	 3)	Each	 one	 of	 the	 previous	 completed	 stimulus	 sequence	 was	 then	introduced	 1000	 times	 into	 the	 computational	 simulation	 to	 obtain	 their	learning	lengths.	Thus,	from	the	set	of	106	learning	lengths,	it	was	obtained	the	learning	length	frequency	distribution	for	the	specific	subject	assuming	he	 follows	 the	 mathematical	 model	 during	 the	 game.	 Therefore,	 if	 the	actual	 participant’s	 learning	 length	 is	 out	 of	 the	 frequency	 distribution	limits,	the	subject	is	extracted	from	the	sample.	Model	 fitting,	 bootstrap	 and	 experiment	 simulation	were	 programmed	 in	MATLAB	(MathWorks)	v17	and	R	v3.3.1,	package	nlstools	(Baty	2015).	
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SUPPLEMENTARY	MATERIAL		
Overview	of	data	analysis		The	main	objective	of	the	proposed	experiment	is	to	figure	out,	by	trial-and-error,	the	association	rule	underly-ing	the	testing	game	phase	after	the	participant	has	solved	the	previous	conditioning	training	stage.	The	answer	of	each	participant	was	stored	as	a	binary	vector,	1/0	for	right/wrong	answer.	Thus,	the	set	of	answers	for	each	experimental	group	was	arranged	as	a	1-0	matrix,	where	rows	and	columns	correspond	to	participants	and	trials	respectively.	The	specific	analysis	of	each	dimension	allows	quantifying	the	population	learning	process	(collaps-ing	information	from	rows)	and	individual	learning	performance	(grouping	information	from	columns)(Fig.	1S).	
	
	
Figure	1S.	Data	structure	and	analysis	of	data.	 	The	experimental	results	are	structured	 in	a	binary	matrix	of	 fails	 (white	squares)	and	successes	 (colored	squares),	per	subject	and	 trial.	 In	 the	above	representation	participants	with	 the	same	 learning	 length	are	grouped	by	color.	Collapsing	 the	 rows	dimension	give	a	mean	 success	 rate	per	 trial,	 enabling	 the	analysis	of	 the	 learning	process	at	population	 level.	Collapsing	 the	 columns	 dimension	 using	 predefined	 criteria	 (learning	 defined	 as	 18	 successes	 out	 of	 20	 trials)	 allows	 analyzing	 learning	performance	at	individual	level	via	the	learning	lengths	frequencies.			
Task	complexity	The	main	 task	 in	 the	proposed	experiment	 is	 to	 find,	by	 trial-and-error	process	with	 feedback,	 the	association	rule	between	displayed	static	scenes/dynamic	situations	and	up-down	arrow	keys.	This	task	has	been	designed	to	exhibit	 low	complexity,	allowing	any	person	could	 fulfill	 it	with	no	difficulty.	The	 first	 time	an	 image	 is	dis-played	the	participant	will	press	one	of	the	two	keys	randomly	(no	previous	information	is	available).	However	the	feedback	provided	to	his	answer	will	lead	to	the	learning	of	the	association	rule	for	the	shown	image:	if	the	feedback	confirms	 the	correctness	of	 the	answer	 the	participant	 learns	 the	pressed	key	 is	 the	right	one;	 if	 the	feedback	is	negative	the	participant	knows	the	right	key	will	be	the	opposite	to	the	pressed	one.	This	way,	for	a	participant	with	 ‘perfect	recall’	 the	next	 time	this	 image	 is	displayed,	 i.e.	 its	 first	repetition,	 the	answer	will	be	always	correct.	In	this	regard,	a	main	element	to	be	taken	into	account	during	task	performance	is	the	recalling	of	the	learned	association	rule.	Once	the	participant	has	learned	the	key	associated	to	a	specific	image,	the	success	likelihood	at	 the	next	 time	the	same	 image	 is	presented	will	depend	on	the	distance	(in	 trials)	 to	 the	previous	presentation.	Assuming	that	recall	probability	is	described	by	exponential	decay	with	the	distance	between	two	appearances	of	the	same	image,	such	repetition	distance	will	be	an	important	factor	for	task	performance.	In	order	to	assess	the	complexity	of	the	task,	let	us	consider	the	trial	where	all	different	scenes/situations	(three	scenes	 in	the	conditioning	phase	and	six	situations	 in	the	game	phase)	have	repeated	once	(i.e.	have	appeared	twice).	For	 the	 sake	of	 simplicity,	 and	since	 the	 stimuli	 are	 sequences	of	 images	 to	be	associated	with	 the	up-down	arrow	keys,	we	will	refer	to	these	scenes/situations	as	symbols.	Figure	2S,	main	panel,	shows	the	frequen-
cy	distribution	of	this	1st	repetition	trial	for	three	and	six	different	symbols.	Dotted	lines	denote	the	interval	con-taining	 the	90%	of	 the	probability	of	having	all	 symbols	repeated	once:	 [6,	13]	 for	 the	conditioning	phase	and	[12,	33]	for	the	game	phase.	On	the	other	hand,	the	inset	in	Fig.	2S	shows	the	frequency	distribution	of	repetition	distance	for	three	and	six	different	symbols.	Dotted	lines	show	the	expected	repetition	distance:	3	for	the	condi-tioning	phase	and	6	for	the	game	phase.	Since	the	game	phase	is	more	complicate	than	the	conditioning	training	phase	(six	stimuli	vs.	three	stimuli	to	be	classified),	 its	complexity	will	define	the	complexity	of	the	proposed	task.	This	way,	 for	the	game	phase,	 in	the	90%	of	random	sequences	composed	of	33	symbols,	all	symbols	will	repeat	once,	so	they	would	allow	the	learn-ing	the	association	rule	under	the	assumption	of	‘perfect	recall’.	This	conclusion	is	compatible	with	the	expected	stimulus	length	required	to	learn	the	rule:	if	the	expected	repetition	distance	is	6	and	all	six	symbols	must	repeat	at	 least	once,	the	expected	stimulus	length	for	rule	 learning	will	be	36.	Therefore,	 from	this	discussion,	we	can	conclude	that,	in	conditions	of	the	Control	group	and	being	conservative,	it	would	be	expected	to	figure	out	the	association	rule	during	the	game	in	around	30	trials.	
	
Figure	2S.	Evaluation	of	task	complexity.	Main	panel.	Frequency	distribution	of	the	first	trial	where	all	symbols	appeared	repeated	once.	Dotted	line	denotes	the	interval	of	1st	repetition	trials	with	probability	equal	to	0.9.	Inset.	Frequency	distribution	of	repetition	distance	and	expected	repetition	distance	(dotted	line).	Red	and	blue	lines	stand	for	stimuli	with	three	symbols	(conditioning	train-ing	phase)	and	six	symbols	(game	phase).		
Stimulus	difficulty	In	order	 to	monitor	 the	 influence	of	 intrinsic	difficulty	of	 stimuli	over	experiment	performance	we	defined	an	index	quantifying	the	difficulty	to	figure	out	the	game	association	rule	when	a	specific	sequence	of	stimuli	is	dis-played.	Let	us	consider	a	stimulus	s	defined	as	a	sequence	of	length	l	made	up	of	m	randomly	distributed	different	sym-bols.	We	consider	 six	possible	 symbols	 (! ≤ 6),	 corresponding	 to	 the	 six	dynamic	 situations	displayed	during	the	game.	Let	us	denote	by	!!" 	the	distance	between	the	j-th	repetition	of	the	symbol	i	(! = 1,… ,!)	and	its	previ-ous	appearance,	and	by	!! 	the	number	of	repetitions	of	the	symbol	i	in	the	stimulus	s	( (!! + 1) =!!!! !).	We	quan-tify	 the	difficulty	of	 the	stimulus	s	by	evaluating	 the	probability	of	 learning	 the	association	rule	when	 it	 is	dis-played	in	Control	conditions.	Assuming	an	exponential-decay	recall	process,	the	probability	of	recalling	the	cor-rect	association	key	for	the	specific	symbol	i	of	the	stimulus	s	(and	learnt	after	the	first	appearance	of	i	in	s)	will	be	 !!!!!"                        1 	where	a	is	the	decay	constant.	This	way,	the	probability	of	answering	correctly	from	the	stimulus	s	will	be	given	by	
! !, ! =  !(!, !, !)!!!!                       2 	
where	!(!, !, !)	stands	for	the	probability	of	correct	answer	(right	association	key)	at	trial	k,	where	the	symbol	i	(! = 1,… ,!)	is	presented.	Therefore,	making	explicit	the	probability	for	each	one	of	the	m	different	symbols	in	s,	! !, ! 	can	be	written	as:	
! !, ! =  12 ! !!!!!"!!!!!
!
!!! = 12 ! !!! !!"!!!!!
!
!!! = 12 ! !!! !!"!!!!!!!!!                3 	Applying	logarithm	to	both	sides	of	this	expression	we	get		
log ! !, ! = log 12 ! !!! !!"!!!!!!!!! = −! log 2 − ! !!"!!!!!
!
!!!            4 	Note	that	the	decay	constant	a	is	a	scale	factor	for	the	distance	d,	common	to	all	stimuli.	Therefore,	without	loss	of	generality,	we	will	consider	a	=	1.	On	the	other	hand	m	=	6	for	all	stimuli,	so	the	factor	m	log(2)	will	be	a	com-mon	onset.	Therefore,	from	Eq.	(s3)	we	define	the	difficulty	of	stimulus	s,	denoted	by	D(s)	as:		
! ! = !!"!!!!!
!
!!!            5 	This	 way	 the	 stimulus	 !! = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 	 will	 have	 lower	 difficulty	 (D(s)	 =	 7.69)	 than	 the	 stimulus	 !! =1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 	(D(s)	=	18.77).	The	stimulus	difficulty	defined	in	Eq.	(5)	strongly	depends	on	the	stimulus	length	
l.	Thus	 in	order	 to	define	a	difficulty	 index	 that	can	be	compared	among	stimuli	of	different	 lengths:	1)	 it	was	generated	a	 set	of	 samples	where	each	sample	was	made	up	of	100.000	randomly-generated	stimuli	of	equal-length	l,	and	each	stimulus	consist	on	a	symbol	sequence	of	length	l	with	six	different	symbols	randomly	distrib-uted;	lengths	l	vary	between	20	and	80	so	61	samples	were	generated.	2)	For	each	sample,	it	was	obtained	the	normalized	frequency	distribution	of	the	difficulty,	!!(!),	where	l	denotes	the	length	of	stimuli	in	the	sample	and	!	is	the	class	containing	the	difficulty.	3)	Finally,	given	a	stimulus	s	of	length	l	and	difficulty	D(s),	it	was	quantized	its	stimulus	difficulty	index	DI(s)	by	its	cumulative	frequency	in	!!(!),	i.e:		
!" ! = !!(!)!!!!!                   6 	where	!!	denotes	the	class	containing	the	difficulty	D(s)	of	the	stimulus	s.	The	difficulty	index	allows	us	to	show	that	there	is	no	influence	of	the	stimulus	structure	over	experiment	per-formance	since	no	significant	correlation	exists	between	learning	length	and	difficulty	index	(Fig.	3S).	
	
Figure	3S.	Stimulus	difficulty	vs.	learning	length.	No	significant	correlation	is	observed	in	the	functional	sample	between	stimulus	difficulty	index	and	learning	length.	p-value	=	0.63.		
Individual	stable	performance	It	has	been	postulated	that	successfully	triggering	behavior	in	humans	follows	an	exponential	decay	rate,	related	to	the	ability	and	motivation	involved	in	a	particular	task	[Fogg	2009].	Based	on	the	stimulus	difficulty	evalua-tion,	we	can	safely	assume	any	participant	in	our	experiment	had	enough	ability	to	successfully	carry	it	on.	This	
means	we	can	consider	the	ability	as	a	fixed	feature	across	the	subjects,	and	reduce	the	outcome	variability	to	the	motivation	 dimension,	 thus	 dividing	 the	 sample	 between	motivated	 individuals	 that	 correctly	 performed	 the	task,	showing	a	stable	performance,	and	unmotivated	individuals	who	did	not.	A	potential	indicator	of	this	latter	group	is	the	appearance	of	a	sample	fraction	(18%)	that	does	not	fit	 for	proportional	hazards	between	experi-ment	and	gender	in	the	Cox	model,	which	in	addition	corresponds	to	participants	with	learning	lengths	greater	than	46	(Fig.	4S).		
	
Figure	4S.	Proportional	hazard	ratio	model	assumptions.	Schoenfeld	test	always	rejects	Cox	assumptions	satisfaction	hypothesis	(proportional	hazard	assumption)	when	considering	individuals	with	learning	length	>	46	(blue	dashed	line	at	0.05	and	red	dashed	line	at	46).	B)	Smooth	increment	in	sample	size	from	learning	length	equal	to	46	shows	the	sudden	drop	in	the	Schoenfeld	p-value	is	not	caused	by	sampling	in	the	Schoenfeld	test	(82%	of	the	sample	corresponds	to	learning	lengths	≤	46).	C)	and	D).	Scaled	Schoenfeld	residuals	against	transformed	time.	Beta(t)	stands	for	regression	coefficients	of	interactions	terms	between	gender	and	experiment	factors.	The	diagnostic	plots	show	a	fitted	spline	of	4	degrees	of	freedom	(solid	line)	and	a	95%	confidence	interval	(dashed	lines).	The	 parallel	 structure	 expected	 from	 the	 proportional	 hazard	 assumption	 is	 lost	 for	 learning	 lengths	 greater	 than	 46,	 indicating	violation	of	non-proportionality	from	this	value.		In	view	of	these	results,	we	explored	more	in-depth	the	performance	stability	of	each	participant	to	assess	the	existence	of	a	‘demotivated’	group	pointed	by	the	collapse	of	the	proportional	hazard	assumption.	In	a	trial-error	procedure,	when	 a	 certain	 stimulus	 appears	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	 subject	must	 randomly	 respond,	 so	 success	probability	to	the	first	appearance	is	0.5.	In	this	context,	if	the	same	stimulus	is	repeated	immediately	after	this	first	appearance	(i.e.	at	the	next	trial)	the	subject	will	always	guess	the	correct	answer.	Thus,	success	probability	for	the	first	repetition	would	be	1.	However,	if	this	first	repetition	occurs	at	a	certain	distance	from	the	first	oc-currence	 (in	number	of	 trials),	 its	 success	probability	could	be	affected	by	various	 factors,	 such	as	distraction,	forgetting,	etc.	The	same	can	be	applied	 to	 the	 following	repetitions	of	 the	stimulus.	We	only	use	 the	 first	 two	repetitions,	since,	according	to	the	simplicity	of	the	task	(Fig	2S),	a	participant	who	is	properly	performing	the	task	should	have	achieved	a	high	learning	rate	at	this	moment.	Taking	the	six	stimuli	together,	we	calculated	the	success	 frequency	 fi(d)	of	 the	entire	sample	at	each	repetition	distance	d,	where	 i	=1,	2	stand	 for	 the	 first	and	second	repetition	respectively.	For	each	subject	its	response	probability	to	the	stimulus	j	which	appears	at	a	dis-tance	tj,	from	its	previous	appearance,	rpi,j,	will	be	fi(tj)	if	he	responded	correctly	and	1-fi(tj)	if	he	failed.	This	way,	the	repetition	probability	rpi	for	each	individual	will	be:		
!!! = !!!,!!!!!                   7 	assuming	the	independence	of	each	response	to	a	certain	stimulus.	If	a	subject	is	performing	the	task	properly,	high	probabilities	of	at	 last	one	repetition	will	be	expected.	On	the	contrary	a	subject	not	responding	properly	will	have	1st	and	2nd	repetition	probabilities	around	or	 lower	than	0.56,	 the	expected	value	for	random	answer	probabilities.	Density	plot	of	1st	 vs.	 2nd	 repetition	probabilities	 shown	 in	Fig	5S	 corroborates	previous	Cox	 re-gression	analysis,	displaying	highest	density	of	subjects	with	 learning	 lengths	≤	46	 in	good-performance	areas	
whereas	subjects	with	 learning	 lengths	>46	corresponds	 to	people	who	are	not	 correctly	performing	 the	 task.	The	detailed	distribution	of	these	two	populations	according	to	experimental	group	and	gender	shows	that	most	subjects	with	 learning	 lengths	≤	46	showed	at	 least	either	the	1st	or	the	2nd	repetition	probabilities	above	ran-domness	(Fig	6S)	while	subjects	with	learning	lengths	>	46	lie	around	randomness	(Fig	7S).		Putting	 together	Cox	regression	analysis	and	repetition	probabilities	we	conclude	 that	 there	exist	 two	popula-tions	characterized	by	their	performance	during	the	game	phase,	showing	that	those	participants	with	learning	length	below	or	equal	to	46	exhibit	a	stable	performance,	which	ensures	an	adequate	and	valid	realization	of	the	experiment.			
	
Figure	5S.	Density	plot	of	 repetition	probability.	A)	Density	plot	 of	 1st	 vs.	 2nd	 repetition	probabilities	 for	 subjects	with	learning	lengths	≤	46	(A)	and	for	subjects	with	learning	lengths	>	46	(B).	Vertical	and	horizontal	scales	are	logarithmic	(log(1	+	sqrt(probability))	is	represented).	White	vertical	and	horizontal	lines	represent	repetition	probabilities	for	random	answer.	
	
	
Figure	6S.	Distribution	of	repetition	probability	according	to	experiment	and	gender	for	Learning	Length	<=	46.	A,	B,	C)	Distribution	 for	Favored,	Control,	and	Hampered	men	respectively.	D,	E,	F)	Distribution	 for	Favored,	Control,	and	Ham-pered	women	respectively.		
 
Figure 7S. Distribution of repetition probability according to group and gender for Learning Length > 46. A, B, C) Distribution for Favored, Control, and Hampered men respectively. D, E, F) Distribution for Favored, Control, and Hampered women respectively.  
Mathematical model 
Analytical model of the population learning process Along this text it will be assumed that stimulus, recall process, and probabilities refer to the game phase for the Favored, Control, and Hampered groups. Let us consider the random variable S denoting the success in the participant’s answer when a dynamic situation is displayed. Therefore, S = 1 / S = 0 stands for correct/wrong answer respectively, i.e. the pressed key matches / does not match with the displayed dynamic situation according to the underlying game association rule. On the other hand we consider that a recall process exists, described by a random variable R, with R = 1 or 0 if the subject recalls or not the corresponding stimulus. Assuming the recall process is present during the experi-ments, the probability of getting a correct answer when the stimulus i appeared t time units ago will be 
!," #,"#," #,"  The recall probability will be 
#," $%"  where a is the recalling decay rate, whereas the probability of non-recalling will be 
#," #," $%"  On the other hand we assume that when the subject recalls, the answer will be always correct, so  and when the subject does not recall, the answer will be random. Thus  This way, from Eq. (8), the probability of getting the right answer by recalling the key associated to the stimulus i (learnt t time ago) will be 
#," $%" $%" $%" $%"  
Let us assume now that 1) time is discrete, measured in terms of trials and 2) the stimulus i has appeared at the trial T. Thus the probability of right answer will depend on when the stimulus i previously appeared, since the association rule will be learnt once it appears, but its recalling will depend on the distance (in trials) between its previous and present appearances. 
The model Let us assume the involved recalling process is only considered when a single stimulus appears up to three times. Thus if this stimulus appears four o more times it is assumed the corresponding association will be always recalled and the probability of successful answer will be 1. In order to sytematize the model, let us define the random variable Xi as the number of times the stimulus i ap-peared in the interval [1, …, T-1]. Thus we can write the overall probability of success when stimulus i has ap-peared at the trial T as: 
# # # # # # # # #    (14) where subindex i denotes probabilities referred to the stimulus i.  Let us analyze separately the four terms in the right side of Eq. (14). If the stimulus hasn’t appeared yet in [1, …, T-1] (so it appears for the first time at trial T), there’s no prior infor-mation, so the subject will press one of the two keys randomly, i.e. #  and 
# # # # # # &$'  If the stimulus has appeared once previously, then 
# # # # #&$'"(' #  On the one hand, according to the binomial distribution  
# # &$) On the other hand, if the stimulus i has appeared at the trial t then 
# # # #,#$%  so 
! ! !,#$% ! !#$&%'& !
#$( $)*#$%+#$&
%'&  #$( $)*#$%+#$&%'&  where  
$)*#$%+#$&%'&
$)*#$&+)  
Substituting back in Eq. (16) 
! ! #$( $)*#$&+)  Let us consider now that the stimulus i appears twice in the interval , at trials t1 and t2. Then 
# # # # # #&$'"*("+,'
&$'
"+('  The probability # # of the stimulus i appears twice in the interval  is given by 
# # ) &$-  On the other hand the probability of recalling the stimulus association depends only on the distance between T and t2, the last trial where the stimulus appeared. Therefore  
# # # ) #,&$"*  so  
# # # # # #&$'"*("+,'
&$'
"+('  ) &$- $ /&$!)1&$'
"*("+,'
&$'
"+('  Note that the recalling constant is now denoted by b. We develop the sum to obtain: 
$ /&$!)1&$'
"*("+,'
&$'
"+('
$ &&$'
"*("+,'
&$'
"+('  "*
&$'
"*("+,'
&$'
"+('  
 $ /&$'1$  Substituting the Eq. (21) into Eq. (20) we finally get 
# ") &$-  $ /&$'1$  
The remaining term in Eq. (14) refers to the situation where the stimulus has appeared three or more times 
# # # # # #  As the model assumes that the association rule will be always recalled after the stimulus i appears three or more times in the interval , then # #  so 
# # # # # # # # # #  
&$' &$) ) &$-  
Finally, going back to Eq. (14): 
# # # # # # # # #  and substituting the Eqs. (15), (17), (22) and (24) on it, we obtain the probability of successful answer when the stimulus i appears at trial T:  
# &$' $%/&$'1% &$) 
 $ /&$'1$ ) &$-  
Control group The experiment conducted for the Control group consists on a conditioning phase ‘detached’ from the game phase, since no conditioning SM is displayed. This way the probability of successful answer during the game will be the same for the six stimuli presented. Then we can write the overall probability of successful answer at the game trial T as  
#3#('  Since at any single trial all stimuli are equiprobable then  Besides #  does not depend on the stimulus, so  
# 3#(' # #  and, from Eq. (25), the probability of successful answer at trial T for the Control group will be: 
# &$' $%/&$'1% &$) 
 $ /&$'1$ ) &$-  
Favored group According to the hypothesis, for Favored group the DMs of the game, here denoted by i = 1 and 2, were previous-ly learned during the conditioning, after the SM was learnt. Therefore, when DMs appear during the game, the probability of successful answer will be always equal to 1. This way the successful answer probability during the game will be 1 for stimuli i = 1 and 2, and will be given by Eq. (25) for the remaining stimuli i = 3, …, 6. Thus considering again that, at any single trial, all stimuli are equi-probable, we can write the overall probability of successful answer at the game trial T for the Favored group as  
$ #3#(' #
3
#('  
#3#(- #  Substituting Eq. (25) we obtain 
$ &$' $%/&$'1% &$) 
 $ /&$'1$ ) &$-  
Hampered group Following the hypothesis, for Hampered group the DMs of the game phase, again denoted by i = 1 and 2, were previously wrongly learned during the conditioning phase, i.e. the corresponding arrow key for the DMs is the opposite to that learned for the conditioning SM. Therefore the probability of successful answer when they ap-pear for the first time during the game will be equal to 0. When they appear for the second and successive times 
the new association rule will be learnt and the probability of successful answer will be given by Eq. (18). More in detail, let us consider the Eq. (14) for i = 1 and 2:  
',) ',) # ',) # ',) # ',) #  On the one hand 
',) # ',) # ',) # &$'  On the other hand the remaining terms ',) # , ',) # , and ',) #  will be given respectively by Eq. (17), (22) and (24), so we get 
',) &$' $%/&$'1% &$) 
 $ /&$'1$ ) &$-  
Considering then that #  when i = 3, …, 6 is described by Eq. (25), we can write the overall probability of successful answer at the game trial T for the Hampered group as  
% #3#(' #
3
#(' #
)
#(' #
3
#(-  so substituting and simplifying we obtain that  
% &$' $%/&$'1% &$) 
 $ /&$'1$ ) &$-  
 In order to summarize the previous equations, we can write the successful answer probabilities at trial T for Favored, Control, and Hampered groups as: 
$ &$'  
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Computational model of the individual learning performance To assess individual learning performance on the basis of the time compaction hypothesis, a set of 105virtual participants were considered for each experimental group. For each virtual subject, an 80-trials length sequence of random ‘stimuli’ was generated (a number between 1 and 6 corresponding to one of the six displayed dynamic situations). According to the model’s assumption, the response to the first appearance of a given stimulus de-
pends on the previous conditioning: for Control group the answer will always be random, whereas Favored and Hampered group will always guess right or fail the first appearance of those stimuli corresponding to DMs (dy-namic matching situations). For the subsequent trials, the virtual participant will answer according to a exponen-tial recalling process until the learning has been attained, which is assumed at fourth or later appearance of the stimulus. Therefore the model assumes recalling can only happen in the second and third occurrences of the stimulus, so for these simulation trials, the probabilities of recalling will be respectively:  
p(recall at T2) = $%/&*$&+1  
p(recall at T3) = $ /&&$&*1  where a and b are the recalling decay rates, and Ti stands for the trials in which the i-th appearance of such a stimulus occurs. Following a Monte-Carlo simulation, at each trial T{2,3} a random uniform number between 0 and 1 is generated: if it is lower than the recalling probabilities (34) or (35), the virtual subject’s answer will be cor-rect; if not, the virtual response will be random. For four or more occurrences of a certain stimulus it is assumed the answer is always correct. This process is repeated for every participant until the learning criteria is fulfilled (18 successes in the last 20 trials).  
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